


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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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NOVEMBER 9, 1945

WILL U.S. CIVIL CORPS REPLACE OCCUPATION ARMY IN GERMANY?

BERLIN—The successful application of the Potsdam Declaration will depend on the attitude of the German people and the degree of cooperation achieved by the four Allied powers. For the time being, and certainly until the stringencies of this winter have been alleviated by gradual economic recovery, the Germans will remain more concerned with obtaining bare subsistence than with political issues. Most of them have no clear idea of the sufferings they have inflicted on other nations and feel no personal responsibility for what was done in their name. Few appear to have given much thought to reconstruction of Germany on non-Nazi lines, and those who have courageously risked the possible displeasure of fellow-Germans by working with Allied military authorities must, for the moment, rely on Allied support to maintain their positions.

What will happen to them when Allied support is ultimately withdrawn remains an open question. True, many Germans have shown eagerness to denounce Nazis in their communities and to obtain their dismissal from government and other jobs. But this trend seems to represent satisfaction of personal grudges against local *Führers* rather than any coherent political revolt against Nazism.

CAN WE CHANGE THE GERMANS? The United States, acting ahead of the other occupying powers, is planning to hold elections in its zone beginning at the local level in January and ending probably in May with elections in the three states under its control—Bavaria, Württemberg and Greater Hesse. The coordinating committee of the Minister Presidents of these three states, formed in Stuttgart on October 17, represents one more step in the American policy of placing increasing responsibility on the Germans for internal administration, subject to the supervision of the Military Government. American officials consider it essential that the

Germans learn to govern themselves, beginning with the lower levels of administration, and develop a sense of civic responsibility, lack of which in the past proved one of the greatest weaknesses of German political life. The war criminals trials are also intended to focus the attention of the Germans on the record and responsibility of their leaders.

If the Germans can be made conscious of the way in which the misdeeds and mistakes of these leaders brought about Germany's present plight, there would be hope for a genuine effort on their part to cooperate in the restoration of the nation. But if no such consciousness appears among the Germans, their tendency will be to oppose any measures, hard or soft, taken by the Allies. The peacetime cooperation of the Germans with other peoples will depend less on the destruction or removal of German industry than on the spirit in which they are prepared to use their remaining economic resources and their industrial "know-how," which far surpasses that of their neighbors. Little has as yet been done by the Allies to change the spirit of the Germans, and it is difficult to see how it can be fundamentally modified except through a spiritual reconversion by harmonizing and defining more clearly Allied policies toward Germany.

NATIONAL INTERESTS GUIDE ALLIES. The work of the Allied Control Council has revealed divergences among the powers that reflect well-known national differences. The British, with their long experience in colonial administration, have used a relatively small number of well-trained administrators to direct the activities of the Germans in their zone. Since Britain needs a market for its products, there is a tendency on the part of some British to deplore the lowering of the German standard of living. The Americans, who want quick results, have worked like beavers and occasionally, through over-

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zealousness, have gotten in the way of efforts by Germans to speed their own political and economic recovery.

The Russians, whose country had been methodically devastated by the Germans, have removed from their zone all plants, equipment and consumers' goods they need, considering them legitimate reparations for their losses. At the same time, they have urged the Germans to effect their own salvation by ridding themselves of Nazi elements, and have taken great pride in encouraging manifestations of German culture and in showing their respect for German intellectual achievements. The French have not lagged behind the Russians in helping themselves to foodstuffs and consumers' goods in their zone, considering these materials as legitimate reparations. They have displayed a sympathetic attitude toward separatist sentiment, especially in Baden, and have vigorously opposed the formation of the five central administrative departments—finance, industry, foreign trade, communications, and transport—envisioned in the Potsdam agreement, on the ground that France did not participate in the Potsdam decisions. It is obvious that France, which fears the reconstitution of a strong central government in Germany, is determined to obtain settlement of its demands for internationalization of the Ruhr, and establishment of French control (possibly shared with Belgium and Holland) over the Rhineland, before it will consider the formation of central departments, strongly favored by the other three powers.

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS NEEDED. None of the problems raised in the Allied Control Council, according to Allied officials in all four zones, is beyond the possibility of reasonable settlement, provided the Big Four can agree as to their concept of the post-war world into which Germany must sooner or later be integrated. But effective handling of Germany's problems requires, first of all, that the Allies clearly indicate their intention to remain as long as this may prove necessary. Above all, it is important that the United States clarify its policy toward Germany. Most American observers agree that the military occupation in the United States zone could be effectively maintained by a relatively small number of troops, perhaps detached from the regular army, and by a corps of civilian administrators familiar with German affairs.

To achieve this arrangement, three measures ap-

pear to be particularly urgent: (1) President Truman should issue a statement of policy indicating the determination of the United States to participate in Allied occupation of Germany for as long as this may prove to be necessary; (2) a special agency to deal with occupation affairs should be created, similar to the agency already created for this purpose by the British, to expedite decisions on policy now too often delayed in Washington due to pressure of other business; and (3) a campaign should be undertaken to recruit well-qualified civilians prepared to serve in Germany for a stated number of years—not sit on the edge of their chairs eagerly waiting to return home, as many of the military personnel long overseas are now doing. The work to be accomplished in Germany represents a great and arduous service to assure the future security of the United States. The work of Americans who undertake this task should not only be subjected to careful scrutiny, but should also be accorded proper recognition and support at home.

ALLIES MUST SUPPORT LEFTISTS. We must realize that we are in the process of effecting in Germany a political and social revolution which, if it has lasting results, will leave a political régime definitely Left of center and an economy subject to extensive government controls. This change in Germany is favorable to the interests of the United States and other United Nations because it is the Leftist elements which are positively anti-Nazi and genuinely anxious to work with the Allies. Failure on the part of the Western powers to support these elements after 1919 was directly responsible for the collapse of the Weimar Republic. We must approach the Germans neither in a spirit of blind revenge nor blind sentimentalism, but with the determination to discover, in concert with them, the flaws in modern society that lead to the ruthless use of scientific invention for destructive purposes and to remedy these flaws in such a way that industry, instead of having to be crippled for fear of its lethal effects, can eventually be used freely by all countries for the benefit of the community.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second in a series of articles on Germany.)

Middle East Diary, by Noel Coward. Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.00

Using the war as a backdrop the actor-playwright does a rather charming, slight tale of his performances in the Middle East.

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NEW REVOLTS FOLLOW OLD PATTERNS IN BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA

In Latin America a new cycle of revolutions has set in during the past two years. In Ecuador, Colombia, San Salvador, Guatemala and, most recently, in Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, uprisings have occurred which seem to have only one thing in common—the use of force rather than the ballot box to effect desired changes in government. Indeed the pessimistic observer is led to conclude that the only advance over the 19th century and its "gay civil wars" has been in man's mastery of the science of destruction. All the lethal instruments and techniques of 20th century warfare—tanks and bazookas, dive-bombing and strafing of defenseless villages—have been put to use in these revolutions, which are miniatures of the great operations of World War II.


While the war lasted, the attention of Latin Americans was riveted on the global struggle in which they were; whether or not the fact was immediately apparent, profoundly involved. At the same time, those in power resorted to the ancient device of postponing difficult political decisions on the pretext that pressing external problems should have priority. For President Getulio Vargas of Brazil this policy bore bitter fruit when, on October 29, the eve of the long-overdue presidential elections, he was ousted by the army. During his fifteen years in office, Vargas had retained his position against mounting opposition by judiciously favoring in turn the liberal and reactionary elements within the government whenever this appeared politically advantageous. His delicately balanced power was seriously threatened in mid-February of this year by both groups. At that time, the President, who in 1943 had promised that elections would be held at the end of the war, finally set the date for December 2 and, after the fashion of Brazilian electoral politics, appointed General Eurico Dutra, one of those who were then planning revolution, as the government's presidential candidate. This alliance of convenience was not fated to succeed. Vargas, who had named Dutra only to split the army opposition, was flirting with the Communists in a project to postpone elections and convoke a representative assembly to write a more democratic constitution for Brazil. When he took the first step toward implementing this plan, his War Minister, General Goes Monteiro, forced him to hand the government over to the Supreme Court. As the people of Rio de Janeiro went wild with joy, Chief Justice José Linhares became interim head of the government pending elections which will be held as scheduled.

WHAT WILL REVOLTS BRING? To infer from the fall of Vargas that a great stride toward democracy has been taken would, however, be to put too much credence in the professedly liberal intentions of the opposition. The old guard of the pre-

Vargas period, which was hardly more satisfactory from a democratic standpoint, is attempting a comeback through the candidacy of Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, who is now expected to win since General Goes Monteiro has transferred his support—and the weight of the military machine—from Dutra to Gomes. Unless Brigadier Gomes, at best a reluctant candidate, takes strong leadership of the ill-assorted elements constituting his following and initiates certain clearly indicated reforms, such as elimination of the authoritarian features of the Constitution of 1937 and of the control of public opinion, the events of October 29 will have done no more than change the occupants of the Guanabara Palace. Moreover, with the ex-President's intentions still a mystery in the incredibly complicated political jungle of Brazil, that country may even witness a repetition of the events that occurred in Argentina—for Vargas, like Perón, may make a strong bid for a return to power.

The Venezuelan revolution of October 18, which overthrew the government of General Isaías Medina, was also precipitated by the prospect of managed presidential elections. But while the Brazilian move was aimed at unseating a 15-year-old dictatorship, the week-long fighting in Caracas reflected the dissatisfaction of some groups with the sluggishness of the Medina government in bringing Venezuela out of its long travail under the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez. It is charged that in the ten years since Gómez died, the administrations of General Eleázar López Contreras, himself a candidate in the forthcoming elections, and Medina have done little to implement projected social and economic reforms, while keeping power in the hands of a small group of people representing the wealthy mountainous western region of the country. The revolt was engineered by disaffected elements in the army, who at the eleventh hour were joined by the moderately leftist Democratic Action Party. It is entirely possible that the young West Point or German-trained officers in the provisional government have motives quite different from those of their civilian colleagues. The government, headed by Dr. Rómulo Betancourt, has limited itself to announcing its intention of inaugurating machinery for direct election of the president by universal suffrage and secret ballot, bringing to trial all officials of the previous government charged with corruption in office, and taking steps to reduce the cost of living and raise living standards. After receiving assurances that foreign oil holdings would be respected and that the new cabinet is composed of reputable and patriotic men, the United States on October 30 recognized the revolutionary government.

OLIVE HOLMES



Washington News Letter

WASHINGTON DIVIDED ON U.S. INTERVENTION IN CHINA

The general public today has an opportunity to play a direct part in the shaping of United States policy toward China, where, under the cloak of temporary military responsibility, we currently are setting up a sphere of long-term political influence. The nation apparently accepts gladly the proposition, frequently stated by the Administration, that the existence of a strong and stable China is essential to the welfare of this country, but it could begin now to consider whether, to strengthen China, we should strengthen the régime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the possible cost of deep American involvement. The Administration itself is divided over this issue, which has become acute as the result of three developments: (1) The outbreak of civil war between enemy Chinese armies commanded by Chiang and by the government of the northern provinces; (2) the continued stationing of two United States Marine divisions in northern China, to regain for Chiang territories which his own forces could not recapture; and (3) the announcement on November 2 in Chungking that the United States will establish a five-year military mission in China to assist the Generalissimo in reorganizing his armies, standardizing equipment and setting up training centers.

UNITED STATES INTERVENES ALONE. China's troubled affairs confront the United States with a difficult decision as to which of three possible courses to follow. First, we could rely on the assurances given by Chiang that internal dissension will be settled by peaceful political means and accord him the usual moral assistance a recognized government can legitimately claim from other governments with which it maintains diplomatic relations. Second, we could put upon all Chinese the responsibility for settling their differences in whatever manner they wish and hold aloof until some sort of settlement is reached. Third, we could assume that the northern Communists are "bandits" and that we ought to assist the recognized government to defend itself.

The Administration disagrees about which course to follow. Even the elements in the Administration which support the policy of intervention see in the very outbreak of civil war an end to hopes that Chiang can calm the dissension by peaceful political means. A general reluctance to see warfare flame anew in China stays the Administration from adopting a policy of complete aloofness. The well-developed military organization of the Communists causes some authoritative observers to doubt that they can be considered "bandits"; those troops today are armed

with heavy field guns and tanks, and even when they were lightly equipped they were able to harry the forces of the Generalissimo. The development of intensive warfare beyond the present skirmishing could cost the United States new military casualties. Yet the masters of policy are basing their course on the supposition that the Communists are "bandits" and that it is our duty to maintain order in Asia by giving military aid to a particular Chinese régime.

The decision that the United States should intervene in Chinese affairs during the period of peace is new, although throughout the war we gave military assistance to Chiang as a fighting ally. Only six weeks ago the Administration was veering in the direction of aloofness and had decided to nominate John Milton Helmick, Judge of the United States Court in China from 1934 to 1942, as Ambassador to succeed General Patrick J. Hurley, who was on his way to Washington from Chungking. General Hurley and Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang and commander of the United States forces in China, are the chief architects of the intervention policy. After General Hurley visited the White House, President Truman decided to retain him as Ambassador and also to return General Wedemeyer to China. As the State Department is not in full agreement with the intervention policy, the problem remains open.

WORLD-WIDE IMPLICATIONS. The issue transcends the question of China. The friends of intervention suspect that the Soviet Union is secretly supporting the Communist forces with arms and counsel. Accordingly, they conceive of our policy as a move simply to protect our normal interest in a portion of Asia which also interests the U.S.S.R. The intervention resulting from this practical consideration of the world relationship of the two mightiest powers nevertheless collides with a universal principle recently enunciated by President Truman, who said on October 27 that "all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source." As long as we consider that aid to Chiang is the same thing as aid to China, freedom of choice within China, whether by ballot or by violence, can exist only with difficulty. By recognizing the new governments of Venezuela and Brazil, the United States last week admitted the right of peoples to change their governments by other instruments than the ballot.

BLAIR BOLLES